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DID SIR EDWARD COKE MEAN WHAT HE 
SAID? 
John V. Orth* 
"When it is said in the books, that a statute contrary to 
natural equity and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be per-
formed, is void, the cases are understood to mean that the courts 
are to give the statute a reasonable construction." 1 So James 
Kent summarized centuries of English constitutional history in 
his magisterial Commentaries on American Law. On its face, the 
sentence is remarkable: the English reports contain cases saying 
that "a statute contrary to natural equity and reason, or repug-
nant, or impossible to be performed, is void," but the judges in 
those cases did not mean what they said; what they meant to say, 
according to Chancellor Kent, is that such a statute should be 
given "a reasonable construction." If that were so, why did they 
not say so? Why did they not say in those very words "a statute 
contrary to natural equity and reason, or repugnant, or impossi-
ble to be performed is to be given a reasonable construction"? Is 
it likely that royal judges, confronting a case involving a statute 
that had necessarily passed both houses of parliament and re-
ceived the royal assent, would lightly use the word "void"? 
In particular, how likely was it when the source, the fans et 
origo, of the idea in question was none other than Sir Edward 
Coke, the oracle-if ever there was one-of the common law? 
What Coke said in Dr. Bonham's Case in 1610, as he himself re-
ported, was: "when an Act of Parliament is against common 
right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, 
the common law will controul it, and adjudge such Act to be 
void."2 The specific violation of "common right and reason" that 
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1. James Kent, 1 Commentaries on American Law 447 (12th ed. 1873). 
2. 8 Co. Rep. 113b, 118a, 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 652 (C.P. 1610). For the most detailed 
account of the case, see Harold J. Cook, Against Common Right and Reason: The College 
of Physicians Versus Dr. Thomas Bonham, 29 Am. J. Legal Hist. 301 (1985). That 
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Coke detected in the facts of Dr. Bonham's Case was the appar-
ent attempt to grant to the Royal College of Physicians both the 
right to impose fines for unlicensed practice and the right to 
keep half of any fines collected: 
(I]f any Act of Parliament gives to any to hold, or to have 
conusans of all manner of pleas arising before him within his 
manor of D., yet he shall hold no plea, to which he himself is 
party; for, as hath been said, iniquum est aliquem suae rei esse 
judicem [it is unfair for someone to be a judge in his own af-
fairs].3 
Sir Henry Hobart, Coke's successor at Common Pleas, ech-
oed this judgment and declared that "an Act of Parliament, 
made against natural equity, as to make a man Judge in his own 
case, is void in it self, for jura naturae sunt immutabilia [the laws 
of nature are unchangeable], and they are leges legum [the laws 
oflaw]."4 Years later Sir John Holt, Chief Justice of the Court of 
King's Bench, said: 
And what my Lord Coke says in Dr. Bonham's case in his 8 
Co(ke's Reports] is far from any extravagancy, for it is a very 
reasonable and true saying, that if an Act of Parliament 
should ordain that the same person should be party and 
Judge, or, which is the same thing, Judge in his own cause, it 
would be a void Act of Parliament. .. . 5 
Could it be that Coke and the other judges in the books re-
ferred to by Chancellor Kent were merely mouthing dicta, words 
thrown out obiter, "by the way" or "in passing," words on which 
the judicial mind was not really concentrated? 
So Chancellor Kent would have us believe, and so modern 
American historians have repeated. According to Bernard Bai-
lyn, who accepted Kent's gloss: "by saying that the courts might 
Coke's words in his own printed report were well-considered was demonstrated by a 
comparison with manuscript reports of the case and with the other printed version, 2 
Brownl. & Golds. 255, 123 Eng. Rep. 928 (C.P. 1610). See Charles M. Gray, Bonham's 
Case Reviewed, 116 Proc. Am. Phil. Soc. 35 (1972). 
3. 8 Co. Rep. 118b, 77 Eng. Rep. 654. Coke's Latin maxim is drawn from Roman 
law. See Alan Watson, trans., The Digest of Justinian 5.1.17 (U. of Pennsylvania Press, 
1985). For the history of the concept at common law, see D.E.C. Yale, Judex in Propria 
Causa: An Historical Excursus, 33 Camb. L.J. 80 (1974). Coke's animadversion con-
cerning the College's fine of Dr. Bonham is technically dictum since what Bonham was 
immediately challenging was his imprisonment, not his fine. 
4. Day v. Savadge, Hob. 85, 87, 80 Eng. Rep. 235, 237 (C.P. 1615). Hobart also 
echoes Coke's Latin maxim in Calvin's Case, 7 Co. Rep. 1a, 25a, 77 Eng. Rep. 377,407 
(Exch. Ch. 1608) ("leges naturae perfectissimae sunt et immutabiles"). 
5. City of London v. Wood, 12 Mod. 669,687,88 Eng. Rep. 1592, 1602 (K.B. 1701). 
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'void' a legislative provision that violated the constitution, he 
[Coke] had meant only that the courts were to construe statutes 
so as to bring them into conformity with recognized legal princi-
ples,"6 that is to say, to give them a reasonable construction. 
Charles Hobson recently and a little more cautiously said the 
same thing. According to Hobson, it was Blackstone who said 
more accurately what Coke had meant to say: "Coke's dictum, 
resonant as it is to modern ears, should not be read anachronisti-
cally as sanctioning judicial review. Probably he meant no more 
than to state a rule of statutory construction that was substan-
tially in accord with Blackstone's later enunciation of the princi-
ple of legislative sovereignty. "7 To repeat: if that was what Coke 
meant, why had he not said so? And how, exactly, was Coke's 
dictum to be reconciled with legislative sovereignty? 
Kent's Commentaries on the point in question was in fact 
only restating, rather broadly, the formulation in the more fa-
mous Commentaries of Sir William Blackstone. After laying 
down the hardly controversial rule that "acts of parliament that 
are impossible to be performed are of no validity," Blackstone 
conceded that he knew it was "generally laid down more largely, 
that acts of parliament contrary to reason are void. "8 The source 
of this view was, of course, Coke, but Blackstone, with rather 
more candor than Kent, confessed the error in Coke's dictum: "if 
the parliament will positively enact a thing to be done which is 
unreasonable, I know of no power that can control it,"9 giving 
Coke the lie direct. 
To put his meaning beyond all doubt, Blackstone illustrated 
his remark with the very example Coke had used in Dr. Bon-
6. Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution 177 (Har· 
vard U. Press, 1967). See also Bernard Bailyn, ed., 1 Pamphlets of the American Revolu-
tion, 1750-1776 at 412 (Harvard U. Press, 1965): 
Coke had not meant that positive, statute laws were restricted to areas defined 
by a higher law binding on Parliament and that they could be nullified-de-
clared to be legally nonexistent-by the judges as custodians of the higher law 
when they exceeded these bounds. . . . Coke had meant only that the basis of 
statute law, like that of common law, was reason and justice, and that when Jaws 
created unreasonable or manifestly unjust or self-contradictory situations-
situations wherein law violated the principles of law-it was the duty of the 
courts, not to annihilate the statutory provisions, but, as Coke's successor 
Hobart put it, "to mold them to the truest and best use." 
In addition to Kent, Bailyn also relied on S.E. Thome, Dr. Bonham's Case, 54 L.Q. 
Rev. 543 (1938) (arguing that Coke was applying strict rules of statutory construction 
rather than making a constitutional point). 
7. Charles F. Hobson, The Great Chief Justice: John Marshall and the Rule of Law 
60 (U. Press of Kansas, 1996). 
8. William Blackstone, 1 Commentaries on the Laws of England 91 (1760). 
9. ld. 
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ham's Case. Giving as much scope as he could to Coke's dictum, 
Blackstone reluctantly but firmly confined it to cases where gen-
eral words worked unintended consequences: 
Thus if an act of parliament gives a man power to try all 
causes, that arise within his manor of Dale; yet, if a cause 
should arise in which he himself is party, the act is construed 
not to extend to that; because it is unreasonable that any man 
should determine his own quarrel. 10 
But Blackstone knew he could not leave it at that. In can-
dor, with uncharacteristically awkward words that seemed wrung 
from him, he haltingly continued: "if we could conceive it possi-
ble for the parliament to enact, that he should try as well his own 
causes as those of other persons, there is no court that has power 
to defeat the intent of the legislature, when couched in such evi-
dent and express words, as leave no doubt whether it was the in-
tent of the legislature or not."11 Refusing to the end to concede 
the rightfulness, or even the lawfulness, of the proceeding, 
Blackstone rested the result in this case on power alone: English 
courts lacked the power to overrule the legislature. Palliate it as 
he might, the result was not pretty: Parliament could do any-
thing, even so egregious a thing as make a man a judge in his 
own case. 
What made Blackstone right and Coke-retrospectively-
wrong was the English Civil War of 1642-49 and the Glorious 
Revolution of 1688. When, in the early seventeenth century, the 
Stuart monarchs had made a bid for absolute power on the 
French model, their opponents had searched for some counter-
balancing English institution. Not unnaturally, Coke, the great 
lawyer and judge, had sought to locate the limits on royal power 
in the common law, that is, as a practical matter in the courts. 
Despite the facts that the king was the font of justice and that 
English judges were royal appointees, still holding office "du-
rante bene placito" (during the good pleasure (of the Crown)], 
Coke had sought to use certain powerful medieval concepts, 
drawn from natural law and customary right, to cabin the sover-
eign. Barely three years earlier, according to his own account, 
he had warned King James to his face that even a monarch was 
unfit to judge a case between himself and one of his subjects, 
that an Englishman's rights were protected by the "artificial rea-
son and judgment of law," and that the king himself was under 
10. Id. (citing 8 [Co.] Rep. 118, that is, Coke's dictum in Dr. Bonham's Case). 
11. ld. 
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God and the law ("sub Deo et lege"), a concept that King James 
thought treasonable. 12 Coke had counted on a cadre of resolute 
and well-connected judges, led by himself, to stand up to the 
king. As things turned out, of course, the courts proved to be 
frail reeds. The only institution that was a match for the Crown 
was Parliament. 13 
The establishment of parliamentary supremacy meant that 
English courts could never again seriously claim the right to de-
clare statutes void. To do so, as Blackstone put it, would be "to 
set the judicial power above that of the legislature, which would 
be subversive of all government. "14 Lord Campbell later brutally 
dismissed Coke's dictum, calling it "a foolish doctrine alleged to 
have been laid down extra-judicially in 'Dr. Bonham's Case' .... 
a conundrum [that) ought to have been laughed at. ... "15 
Blackstone had not been so contemptuous, but he had been 
forced, as he perceived it, to beat a strategic retreat. With a ma-
neuver Coke himself might have appreciated, Blackstone tried 
to cover his tracks by denying that anything much had changed. 
There were still things Parliament could not do: adopt statutes 
"impossible to be performed." So, something of what Coke had 
said could be raked from the fires of the Civil War: some statutes 
were truly "of no validity." Chancellor Kent, blunderingly, took 
matters farther. By a simple act of commentatoriallegerdemain, 
Kent declared that Coke had not meant what he said. Although 
Coke had said that statutes "against common right and reason, 
or repugnant, or impossible to be performed" were "void," he 
had meant merely that they were to be given "a reasonable con-
struction." In a final irony that seemed to escape its author, 
12. Prohibitions del Roy, 12 Co. Rep. 63, 65, 77 Eng. Rep. 1342, 1343 (1607). 
D.E.C. Yale described the connection between Coke's confrontation with the king and 
Dr. Bonham's Case as follows: 
In Coke's hands the principle (that no man could be a judge in his own cause] 
was used for something more than keeping subordinate judges to the proprie-
ties of judicature. He employed it to tell the king to his face that the sovereign 
could not personally judge a cause between himself and his subjects, and he was 
understood also to have affirmed that the principle was parliament-proof, a rule 
beyond the reach of statute [citing Dr. Bonham's Case]. 
Yale, 33 Camb. L.J. at 83 (cited in note 3). 
13. John V. Orth, On the Relation Between the Rule of Law and Public Opinion, 80 
Mich. L. Rev. 753, 762 (1982) (reviewing Richard A. Cosgrove, The Rule of Law: Alben 
Venn Dicey, Victorian Jurist (V. of North Carolina Press, 1980)). 
14. Blackstone, 1 Commentaries at 91 (cited in note 8). 
15. Lord John Campbell, 1 The Lives of the Chief Justices of England 298 (Soule, 
Thomas & Wentworth, 1874; 1st ed. 1849). Risible or not, Lord Campbell admitted that 
~e had "often" heard it "quoted in parliament against the binding obligation of obnox-
IOUS statutes." I d. 
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Kent worked this magic in his Commentaries on American Law, 
the one off-shoot of English common law in which the courts did 
have the power to declare statutes void! When in the fullness of 
time the United States Supreme Court confronted a judge in his 
own case, who was empowered by statute to pocket part of any 
fines he levied, it cited Bonham's Case and adjudged the act to 
be void.16 
16. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510,524 (1927) (violation of Due Process Clause). 
